AMERICAN PREDATORY LENDING AND THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
Interview with
Jeffrey Loeser
Bass Connections
Duke University
2020
PREFACE
The following Oral History is the result of a recorded
interview with Jeffrey Loeser conducted by Sean Nguyen on November 5, 2020.
This interview is part of the Bass Connections American Predatory Lending and
the Global Financial Crisis Project.
Readers are asked to bear in mind that they are reading a
transcript of spoken word, rather than written prose. The transcript has been
reviewed and approved by the interviewee.
Transcriber: Neha Vangipurapu |
Session: 1 |
Interviewee: Jeffrey Loeser |
Location: Zoom |
Interviewer: Sean Nguyen |
Date: November 5, 2020 |
Sean Nguyen: I'm Sean Nguyen, an undergraduate student from the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a member of the Bass
Connections American Predatory Lending and Global Financial Crisis team. It is
Thursday, November 5th, 2020. And I'm speaking via Zoom with Mr. Jeffrey
Loeser, Principal Assistant Attorney General in the Ohio Attorney General's
office, for an oral history interview today. Mr. Loeser, thank you for joining
me today.
Jeff Loeser: Yeah, you're welcome. And thank you
for having me.
Sean Nguyen: I'd like to start by first
establishing a bit about your background. You received your B.S. from The Ohio State
University in 2004, and a J.D. from there in 2007 as well. Is that right? And
are you originally from Ohio?
Jeff Loeser: It is right. And yes, I am. I
grew up in the Toledo area, which is Northwest Ohio, a suburb called Sylvania,
and moved down to Columbus when I went to Ohio State and then stayed ever
since, so, Midwestern kind of guy.
Sean Nguyen: … You started your career as an Assistant Attorney General
within the Ohio Attorney General's office in 2007, in the very early days of
the financial crisis. Can you describe a little bit about your official
responsibilities then and how they related to the market for residential mortgages?
Jeff Loeser: Yeah. … so
I joined the office right out of law school in September of 2007 and I really
had no, no plans or intention of really being involved with predatory lending
or mortgage foreclosures when I joined. But they were talking with me and said,
hey, we're starting to see some foreclosures and we're starting a group to look
at this and pay attention to it. And we need a first-year attorney to kind of
help out with it. Would you like to do it? And it sounded really interesting,
and I said sure. And for the next 12 years or so, it was a lot of what I did. My
duties early on were – so back in 2007-2008 was kind of right when a lot of the
foreclosures were happening. And at least before the financial crisis in 2008
was primarily focused on subprime loans.
And I would say that my duties were
really kind of two things. So the state of Ohio with
local companies like bad mortgage brokers, a lot of appraisers, started to see
some foreclosure rescue scams. Consumer Protection would just file local cases
and enforcement actions against them, usually getting money back for consumers
or shutting down the company. And then secondly, we started to look a lot at
some of the more national larger players, particularly some [of] the larger
mortgage originators in the subprime field, and then the mortgage servicers … a
little bit less enforcement and more trying to work with them on figuring out
what was going on and corrections we could make.
Sean Nguyen: And just to reiterate what I
heard correctly. So your responsibilities were
primarily two: the first of which was sort of enforcement actions against
mortgage foreclosure scams or things like that. And the second one was – could
you explain the second point again as well?
Jeff Loeser: Yeah, so [it'd be good] to back it up a little bit. So
[as] a consumer protection attorney with the AG's office, ... we both monitor
companies and kind of work with the companies to implement best practices. And
then with really bad actors we'll take enforcement action and usually a court
action against them. And so there were enforcement
actions. But particularly against the bigger national companies, early on, we
were starting to meet with mortgage servicers to talk about, hey, foreclosures
are starting to rise. Are there loan modifications you can give? Are there
steps you can take to help individuals, borrowers get
better or quicker assistance on the phone? So I guess
the second part of it would be working with companies, talking with them about
what they're doing, what they're seeing in the market. Are there ways that we
can help or is there advice we can provide? And if there are problems that are
potentially illegal or practices that are illegal, we'll look further into it
and see if action has to be taken.
Sean Nguyen: And were there other agencies whether state or federal
that ...the Attorney General's office in Ohio worked closely with on issues relating
to the residential mortgage market?
Jeff Loeser: So, yes. I'm trying to think like back in 2007-2008, so
at least in Ohio, there is the AG’s office. And then there is the, in the Ohio
Department of Commerce, there's the division – Division of Financial
Institutions, which regulates both Ohio banks, but also various non-bank
financial players. And so we would work with them and
sometimes they would have regulatory authority over the companies. We also
would work with the Ohio Housing Finance Agency, which is – OHFA is what we
call it. They provide like FHA [Federal Housing Administration] type loans to
Ohioans. But during the foreclosure crisis, [they] also ramped up in kind of
being the frontline call center. We called it Save the Dream Ohio, where if a
consumer or a borrower [has] had problems paying their mortgage, ... they would
generally call Save the Dream and Save the Dream would refer more complicated
things or potential illegal allegations to our office for enforcement.
And then in addition to the local
agencies, we also worked very closely with other state Attorney General's
offices throughout the country. So we formed, what did
we call ourselves? We called ourselves the State Foreclosure Prevention Working
Group at that time. And I want to say there were 10 to 15 state AGs as part of
it and Ohio was one of them. And so we worked with
them and talked with other states about what they were seeing. And also more importantly, it's sometimes easier to, when you're
looking at larger national companies and working with them, it's easier to work
together, both to save everyone's time, but to kind of increase the power of
the combined states. So yeah, we would work with other state AGs as well.
Sean Nguyen: … Can you talk a little bit more about that work that
you did with other Attorney General's office[s] and then specifically, what
states opted into that, [or] opted out of that? How was that group formed? And
then again, what were the responsibilities that that group took on?
Jeff Loeser: Yeah, so it's an interesting question because the duties
changed over time and actually it's still like to a certain extent still in
existence. And I've basically sort of in the last year dropped off the calls,
but the Ohio AG office is still part of it. So it
formed in the summer or fall of 2007, actually, I think right before I joined
the office. And my memories of how it first formed was – states were starting
to see these subprime loans default. And it was clearly becoming a problem.
This was maybe a year before like the true financial crisis [in the] fall of '08,
where it shot up a ton. But even before – so I guess, even going before 2007,
states have always worked together in a multi-state context where if there's a
company or a problem that applies nationwide, it just makes sense for states to
work together and looking at it. The big tobacco settlement in the ‘90s was
probably one of the first major ones, but the states had worked together in
some subprime lending cases. Ameriquest is the main
one. And actually that was a little bit before my
time. So I don't know a ton of the details about it,
but we drew upon that to start this Foreclosure Prevention Working Group. The
states that were involved – and I'm sure I'm going to miss some – but the ones
that I remember the most are: Iowa kind of took the lead in it. Attorney
General Tom Miller. Illinois, Texas, North Carolina, Ohio, Massachusetts,
Colorado. Washington was involved a lot. California. Those are some of them.
And then other states have come in
and out over the years. Oregon, if I didn't mention them. Yeah, North Carolina
has always been involved. Maryland, occasionally. So those were some of the
states that were involved. There's always been – [it’s always] tried to be a
bipartisan effort. But they try to have both Republicans and Democrats in the
group. And that's kind of how we formed and who was involved. And at least
early on, it was, it wasn't so much [an] enforcement or case-bringing group so
much as we just want to talk with the industry about what's happening and see
if we can kind of get some ideas of what's going on in the world. And are there
ways that the states can help what's going on – states would help avoid
foreclosures and help create these contacts with the companies involved.
Sean Nguyen: …[C]an [you] recall a specific case that you worked on
early on in your career, either in that multi-state working group, or even in
the Ohio Attorney General's office that dealt with residential mortgages and
what that case experience was like?
Jeff Loeser: So the biggest one, and I'll go with
the multi-state cases, but if we want to talk about Ohio specifically, I can
try to remember some going back then, but by far the biggest early one was our
case against Countrywide in 2008. So Countrywide was one of the biggest
subprime lenders in the early to mid-2000s. At least one of the biggest that
wasn't part of a national bank. And they were – I think I can fairly describe
it as issuing problematic loans that were what we would call Pay-Option ARMs
[adjustable-rate mortgages], where your rate changed constantly. And it wasn't
just a variable rate, it was a loan where you could literally choose how much
you want to pay each month, and you can choose to pay less than ... even the
interest to pay for it. And so your principal would go
up, which is obviously problematic. I...If you're an
experienced lawyer ... or a law student, you might understand that. But a lot
of people I think got confused and started all the sudden realizing that they
... owed much more than they thought they did on their loans.
... Countrywide and a lot of these
lenders thought that, oh, when these problems happen, we could just refinance
the house because the house will have increased in value by tens or hundreds of
thousand[s] [of] dollars at that point. And then the market crashed, and that
was impossible. So here – you have this going on. And so
we, as the states, got together. Countrywide, ... at the time, we thought was
one of the worst actors in this field, and we investigated them and reached,
what at the time, I thought was a very groundbreaking settlement with them in,
I believe, October of 2008. The main part of it was, first off, we were going
to send checks to borrowers who had been foreclosed or lost their homes to
foreclosure. But even more importantly, we set up a standard where certain
individuals, if you met certain characteristics on income or the amount of your
loan, or the type of your loan, [you] would automatically qualify for a loan
modification, and this was pre even the Obama HAMP [Home Affordable
Modification Program] – the federal HAMP program, which started in 2009, before
I think some of the early Federal Reserve type loan modification programs. It
just wasn't done at the time.
And Countrywide was, I think,
probably the first major settlement where loan modifications were viewed as
perhaps a good way out of these problems. And certainly
like changes were made future cases. But I'll always remember that as really
being the first major predatory lending action or settlement that wasn't just a
small local mortgage broker in Ohio.[1]
Sean Nguyen: … Could you explain specifically that loan modification
program that Ohio rolled out, what did it look like? And ... why was it so
groundbreaking?
Jeff Loeser: Yeah, so let me – I may not remember like the actual
details of it 12 years later, and just to be clear, it wasn't just Ohio. This
is all the states. But what the idea was and I think it actually — [I’m] trying
to remember back on the details. I think the HAMP program, which the federal
government developed several months later really kind of followed the
Countrywide settlement. But the basic ideas were if you didn't have enough
money to pay your mortgage, and there were calculations basically of your
income compared to your debt payments, your DTI [Debt-to-Income] ratio, you
would then walk through this waterfall where we first try to basically take
different steps within your loan to see if there's ways to modify it. And you
try to do the simpler ways first before you get to more complicated. So you first try to reduce your interest rate to somewhat
normal prime levels. I'm trying to remember if at the time Countrywide had
principal reductions in the end. I honestly can't remember off the top of my
head. Certainly principal reductions became a bigger
thing within several years of that.
…[It changed from] you have to prove
lots of very specific things to if you meet these qualifications, you basically
should be considered for a loan modification, which at the time was a pretty
big leap. And it did all rest – the backstop was always what we called Net
Present Value. The security holders of
the loans, whatever loan modification was done, had to long-term still be
revenue neutral.... And so the idea was that there
wasn't a loss. Now I think back at the time, there's always the question of
like, if everyone's benefiting from this, why was like the government action
even necessary? If these were modifications that would help the security
holders long-term. [We were] able to
convince a lot of industry players that no, this actually is the best way; that
if we don't do this, people are going to lose their homes. Foreclosure costs
everyone money. It destroys neighborhoods. You lose property value even around
the neighborhood. And yeah, I think it was a good step. I think a lot of HAMP
was kind of, to a certain extent, was based on some of the Countrywide stuff.
...The National Mortgage Settlement
several years later kind of built on it and made some changes, but Countrywide
was the first big one that I remember. And what's maybe interesting with
Countrywide is it was very much a subprime lender. So
modifying these loans ...-- there was an illegal action that occurred for the
person getting the loan. There was some sort of violation of of state law when these loans were originated, [so] ... a
good, legal remedy to that was to correct the loan or if the person had lost
their house, to send them a check.
Sean Nguyen: [The Ohio] Attorney General, Richard Cordray, brought a
suit against Carrington Mortgage Services in 2009, which is a servicing firm
that took part in the Home Affordable Modification Program,...
that you had mentioned. Were you involved with this lawsuit?
Jeff Loeser: I was, yeah. And go ahead and
ask some questions. I'll try to refresh my memory of kind of the details of
that one.
Sean Nguyen: ...[W]hat legal strategy did Ohio's Attorney General's
office employ in a case or cases like this one?
Jeff Loeser: So, yeah, so this was actually, this would have been
2009, I believe. The summer of 2009. I might be off by several months [with]
that, but ... by this point, the mortgage crisis had kind of moved into what
I'd call the broad economic financial crisis stage, where you're no longer
looking at just subprime loans, that the way they were structured led to
defaults. You're basically looking at a lot of people who had normal fixed rate
or normal variable loans, who all of a sudden lost their jobs because
unemployment was at 10% or whatever. And the problems we would start to see
with the servicers was that many of them were just not able to provide the
services that were necessary to service the number of loans that were needing
help. And I'll have to say, I don't remember specifically, for Carrington, what
we alleged. I think there were also several other cases we brought, I believe
we brought one against HomEq [Servicing] and several
others that I don't want to get the names wrong, because they changed so much
and were bought out by banks and what not that I can't remember. But our
allegations were generally along the lines of – Ohio's Consumer Protection Act
requires that you provide reasonably reasonable services and not unfair
services, and if you're supposed to be providing servicing that you're not able
to provide, because you can't answer the phones, you can't provide the help
that you're required to. We alleged that was a violation of the CSPA [Consumer
Sales Practices Act], and I'm sure there were other specific allegations, like
company by company, but I just honestly don't quite remember what they were.
Sean Nguyen: … [Were there] any other cases that the Ohio Attorney
General's office brought against other mortgage servicers?
Jeff Loeser: And I'm sure you could Google this. And there was one …,
we abbreviated it AHMSI. American Home [Mortgage] Servicing [Inc.], but I'll
have to check on that. I'm sure I can follow up in an email. There were several
cases that were brought. My memory is that most of them we ended up settling
for similar kind of relief. The other kind of major multi-state cases were
settled for basically improving your servicing, providing people individual
contacts, setting up firm timelines by which to respond to loan modifications.
So interestingly, and I'll also say, so several years later, the Ohio Supreme
Court actually ruled that in many cases our Consumer Sales Practices Act does
not cover mortgage servicing. So we've kind of backed
off litigating some of those cases, but we still work very closely with
servicers and people basically just passing on complaints from consumers
saying, hey, can we work this out? Are there ways to work it out?
Sean Nguyen: Could you describe your role in
the Attorney General's office during the 2012 National Mortgage Foreclosure Settlement?
I know you had mentioned it previously, but were you involved in the
negotiations with GMAC or Bank of America, Citi, Wells Fargo, et cetera?
Jeff Loeser: Yeah, I was. So I was – I would
have been a third- or fourth-year attorney at the time. So
there were two other attorneys in the office a little bit senior to me. Susan
Choe, my Section Chief in Consumer Protection at the time was very involved,
but I was also an attorney on it. Ohio was part of the Executive Committee of
the ... the robo-signing investigation. So the way
state and multi-state works, any state,... if they're
interested in an area, can join a multi-state. But just because there's so much
going on, whether mortgages or just the consumer protection world in general,
they usually appoint, the groups can appoint a group of states – five, 10, 15 –
to be what we call an Executive Committee. And Ohio was on the Executive
Committee. So yeah, I was on most of those phone calls and negotiating with the
banks and just figuring out what was going on.....
Sean Nguyen: ...[C]ould you provide just a
broad overview of what that case was and exactly what that settlement was? What
happened?
Jeff Loeser: ... I generally refer to the start of it as the – what we
call the robo-signing scandal. Although it kind of
expanded into other things. So the robo-signing
scandal broke I want to say in September of 2010, and I kind of remember it as
just like the busiest time in my 12 years as a consumer protection lawyer and
just the amount of media attention to what was going on. But – so basically the
baseline robo-signing allegations are, every state
that has a judicial foreclosure process, … [that is,] when you file for
foreclosure, you have to go to court to actually do it, you're required to sign
an affidavit saying,... here's who owns this loan.
Here's the debtor, here's the bank or other security holder. Here's how much is
owed on the loan. Here's how much it's been missed. Usually there's some other
statements such as the debtor is not an active-duty military service member.
And you have to sign all these with personal knowledge.
And in most states, including Ohio, [you]
have to get them notarized. And basically what kind of
broke [and what ended up] coming out of some depositions of some companies was
that many, many, many of these affidavits were being signed by people who
didn't have any knowledge of the underlying facts in the affidavits. And – now
all of this is kind of electronically kept -- it's all more or less pulled from
the bank or the servicer's electronic files. But there was supposed to be
somebody reviewing that this is accurate, that it lines up with the loans. And,
you have people, I kind of remember allegations of people signing thousands of
affidavits a day. And it was just so abundantly clear that there's no way that
the person involved had personal knowledge of what was happening. And what this
led to is, there wasn't normal, and I'm sure it happens sometimes, but not like
an incredibly often thing where like you literally foreclosed on the wrong
person. … I do remember seeing a lot of misstatements of the amounts due or
what was owed. Whether some of the military [Servicemembers Civil Relief Act]
statements. Yeah, like errors on mis-payments, and even if there wasn't errors, there's still reason when you're in court,
why you need somebody to affirm and swear under oath that they have personal
knowledge of the documents that are being presented to the court.
So anyway, all of a sudden it came
out that pretty much the entire industry, although I'm sure that there were
some companies that were not doing this. But at least many of the large players
were having people sign most of their foreclosure affidavits without personal
knowledge. And very quickly, I believe a lot of companies stopped doing
foreclosures, when this came out, at least for a short amount of time.
So, ...to the best of my memory, we
were the only state to actually bring a lawsuit prior to the National Mortgage
Settlement against one of these companies. And that was against GMAC that we
filed in Ohio court. I believe it got removed to federal district court in the
northern district of Ohio. Basically alleging that
these foreclosure affidavits were in violation of Ohio law and that
foreclosures should be stopped until it can be figured out. And then very
quickly the states also came together into what became known as the National
Mortgage Settlement. And I believe, in the end 49 states, everyone except for
Oklahoma, I think joined the settlement. What happened was kind of building off
the state foreclosure prevention working group that I worked on [during]
Countrywide. Some of the states that had worked on Ameriquest
going back to the early 2000s, came together and began investigations of this
and began negotiating with the banks. But it also kind of quickly grew beyond
just robo-signing allegations to a number of
origination problems that had been going on since the mid-2000s and the servicing
problems that we had seen during the financial crisis. So
these things about not processing documents within the required timeframes, not
providing even phone service – staying on hold for hours, things we would call
like a dual track servicing where you would file for foreclosure while you're
telling the person, Hey, we're working out a loan modification, don't worry
about this. So kind of all these things kind of merged
together into the National Mortgage Settlement. And it was long, it was intense,
it was really interesting.
I think the winter-spring of 2012 is
when it settled and, really, I think did some really good stuff for the
industry. The settlement itself -- several major parts to it. There were what
we call servicing standards..., where we put a lot of these changes into place
where the banks were now required to correct a lot of these bad practices that
we had seen, provide what we call a single point of contact. So
when you call in, you have one person that you talk to if at all possible,
preventing dual tracking, requiring that the person signing the affidavits have
personal knowledge. Second part was that they had to give billions of dollars
of relief to consumers, whether it be loan modifications, or checks and
payments, and then finally just some money to the states. Ohio ended up using a
lot of its [funds] on basically destroying abandoned and foreclosed homes that
had brought down property values in Ohio so much. I think it was industry
changing. It was really interesting to be on....
Sean Nguyen: ...[Y]ou mentioned that you
were on the Executive Committee, or you were involved in a lot of those calls
and those negotiations. ...[W]hat were those calls like with those banks and
what were those negotiations like? Specifically, what was the dynamic like
between the Attorney General's office and then these mortgage servicers?
Jeff Loeser: Well, I should preface this by saying that even 10 years
later, I can't talk about any sort of privileged or confidential discussions
that we had. So I probably have to speak a little bit
in generalities and what eventually came out publicly. But I think the biggest
thing I remember at least early on was getting through to the banks that no,
these actions actually are in violation of the law in that the remedies are
remedies because of the violations of the law. And you would hear a lot about,
oh, you're giving loan modifications to people who don’t deserve them or you're
handing out money or something. Or the banks particularly saying like, there's
nothing wrong here and just convincing them that no, there's a reason that
state laws, including Ohio, require that you be honest in the documents that
you swear before a court. That if you were anybody but a national bank or
anyone but a bank or a large financial institution and came into court with
affidavits that you had not reviewed or looked at or just form printed off a
computer, that the judge would yell you out of court. And there was – so I
think initially there was a lot of back and forth about that. Then once we ...
got that [point across], I think people kind of realized that, yeah, there were
violations of the law and unless you want to be involved in a giant court
litigation for years, it's probably best if you try to settle this.
...[T]his was really a back and forth
between the banks and between the states. And every state has different
interests in on the ground conditions. So Ohio,
interestingly, [looks] kind of really bad early on. Like 2006, 2007, I think we
had more subprime loans than a lot of states and places like Slavic Village in
Cleveland. I toured, I think in 2008, and just almost literally like every
third house was vacant and abandoned and just so depressing. We're still in
some ways recovering from it. I live in a neighborhood that was kind of hit
hard, not every third … house, but several houses on every other block that are
vacant still 10 years later. But other states, I think once the actual
financial crisis in 2008 hit, had slightly different [impacts], like Florida
lost a ton of equity. California, I think lost a ton of equity. And so ...
different states have different problems. You also have just different state
AGs have different philosophies.
And so there
was a lot of back and forth among states and between the banks about what is
the best way to correct this problem? How do we remedy what's going on? How do
we help people stay in their homes? How do we make sure the banks don't go bankrupt over this?
And so there – and yeah, again, I can't really talk about some of the confidential
and privileged conversations with it, but it resulted in a settlement that I
think was a very good settlement and that all the parties agreed to....
Sean Nguyen: ...[A]bout the multi-state working group that was formed
--... how exactly did that group work together? Because I imagine with so many
different Attorney Generals and Attorney General's offices, as you said with
different states having different priorities, it could be akin to a lot of
cooks being in the kitchen. How did y'all come together to make these national
suits happen? Just what was that process of working with those groups like?
Jeff Loeser: For the most part, incredibly collegially ... at a staff
level. ... I obviously was not the Attorney General of Ohio... – I believe the
Attorney Generals themselves would occasionally have calls. But at a staff
level, we worked really well together and still do. And it's not just
mortgages, it's any sort of multi-state. I was involved in a big multi-state
against the credit reporting companies and [it had] very similar dynamics where
the states that are kind of most interested will usually form the Executive
Committee.
And so the
Executive Committee in the National Mortgage Settlement was a lot of the same
states that were the first ones involved in the State Foreclosure Prevention
Working Group. And we, gosh, in the heart of it I feel like we were talking on
the phone every other day, if not every day. And then you would occasionally
update all 50 states or all the states that were part of the larger multi-state
and those calls [were] once a week, once every other week. And then at the same
time you had calls and meetings with the banks and also with like other
interested parties. So we would occasionally meet with
some of the security holders, the note holders, which are oftentimes different
than the bank. Advocacy groups. Housing counselors, and groups that help people
who are going through foreclosure, had wonderful ideas. … It is all under both
a threat of litigation and a national emergency at the time. So
I'm not going to say it was all, there was never any yelling or fighting or
arguing, but I think overall it was really collegial and the states in the end,
I think every state but Oklahoma signed on and that is a huge accomplishment.
Sean Nguyen: ...[Were there] any other
groups or individuals outside of the scope of government, outside of the scope
of local or federal agencies that your office worked with in these settlements?
Jeff Loeser: ...[T]he legal aids, definitely. I talked to legal aids a
lot, and I think Susan [Choe] and some of the other attorneys involved [did
too]. They very much on the ground saw what was happening. [They] were able to
provide case studies or examples, as well as just housing counselors and people
who are talking daily. Still within government we – at the AGs office, there's
also a group of non-attorneys who work out consumer complaints and just talking
to them, who were all heroic people during all of this, about what they're
seeing. ...[W]e would also occasionally talk to other industry players who
weren’t actually targets of the investigation but had useful information like
the noteholders of the loans. That's mainly who I can think of when I think of
this, but occasionally like economists, and they’re people who have knowledge
of the general mortgage market.
Sean Nguyen: And how did these groups communicate
their concerns with you all following 2008?
Jeff Loeser: [W]e always try to be very open.
Like people just email us, and I think we also like would reach out to them.
Yeah, people either just email us or call us and say, hey, this is what's going
on. We're interested. Or if we had an area that we wanted to know more about,
... like how MERS [Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems] works or
something, we would just call people. I think the good thing about working for
an AG's office is people usually want to talk to us and particularly when
something is that high-profile and that important. It was never a problem to
get information about what was going on.
Sean Nguyen: ...[We]re there any other problems
besides what we've spoken about, about residential mortgage that you and your
colleagues at the Attorney General's office worried about? If so, what sort of
policy adjustments besides litigation and enforcement did [you] pursue?
Jeff Loeser: So the biggest one that immediately
occurs to me for Ohio is as I mentioned several times that you had lots of
abandoned homes. And it's something that spills over into the neighborhoods,
even those who didn't have the loans that were in foreclosure. Your property
value drops, it just looks terrible, it attracts crime. So that's one where we
put a lot of focus into – on – not really me personally, but there's a lot of
legislative effort to allow speedier foreclosures if something was vacant. And
then once we did reach the settlement, a lot of the money Ohio got we used
towards physically helping county land banks get rid of or demolish bad broken
foreclosed homes. And then either rehab those homes or with the vacant lot
build new homes and sell them back to people. So that was a big one. Other
problems. None really that I can think of. ...[T]he real highlight is that this
wasn't something abstract. That you had thousands and probably tens of
thousands of Ohioans losing their home or being in the constant anxiety of, how
do I make my payments? What happens if I have to lose my home?
And so our
office – it wasn't just litigation like from the AG's office. We had, I
mentioned we had consumer complaint specialists who talk to people. A lot of
consumer education going out to groups in communities saying like, here's what
you need to know about. If you get into foreclosure, please call your servicer
immediately. Don't skip your payments. Don't ignore the problem. And that was
true with all of Ohio government. So I mentioned Save
the Dream, which was run out of the Ohio Housing Finance Agency. But they ran a
giant call center to connect people with housing counselors. The Ohio Supreme
Court worked to train pro bono attorneys to be foreclosure attorneys.
Later on, the federal government had a program, I believe it was called the
Hardest Hit program where they provided money to states that were hit
particularly hard, including Ohio. And so, the Ohio Housing Finance Agency
again through Save the Dream helped do some of their own [home] loan
modifications for borrowers who [wouldn’t] otherwise qualify for [them], giving
them additional money and support. So, yeah, there was a lot Ohio was focused
on in addition to just the litigation with cases.
Sean Nguyen: ...[Y]ou mentioned how you've
been a consumer protection attorney for over 10 years now. Based [on] your
experience in that field, why has consumer protection been so interesting to
you and why have you stuck with it the past – for over 10 years?
Jeff Loeser: So actually I do have to say
like about a year ago I moved out of consumer protection. So
I work for the state solicitor's office now, primarily working on formal
Attorney General opinions, also doing some appellate work. But the reason I
enjoyed it for so long was you really – it's a really interesting mix of
helping people and helping them financially and economically. So I was an economics major. I've always been a little
interested in finance and [there's] always as a public servant, a public
lawyer, you're really there to help people. And this … also holds true for all
the other consumer protection work that I did, whether it's somebody who bought
a used car and is having problems with the used car or had a contractor come to
their house and something went wrong or the contractor stiffed them or things
with other larger companies. If it's credit report problems or other problems
with banks, credit cards, whatever it may be. I've always really enjoyed it.
And particularly I like the mix of like the math and the finance with the legal
aspect of it.
Sean Nguyen: ... Could you talk a little bit about the internal
strategy within the Ohio Attorney General's office sort of following 2008? Was
that set from top down from the Attorney General, or was it a collaborative
approach? How did Ohio's Attorney General's office determine its priorities and
what issues to pursue?
Jeff Loeser: So, I think both top down and bottom up is probably how
I'd describe it. So we, from a very like individual
hearing from Ohioans level, we, gosh, I think we get [20,000 to 25,000]
consumer complaints a year plus or minus 10,000 and over everything, whether
it's mortgages and car dealers or whatever. And they're always – they’re stories.
And I review them. The non-attorneys review them for that matter. I'm going to
guess that the higher ups in the office, the AG and top administration will
look at these complaints too, and see, here's what Ohioans are dealing with.
Here's the problem. So you get [to] 2006, 2007, you
get lots of subprime complaints. Right after that you get tons of foreclosure
complaints. So we would review these complaints and
help make policy recommendations. Recommendations on – these are areas that
there might be illegalities going on we should investigate. At the same time,
every Attorney General that I've worked under, and I’ve worked under five or
six now, I feel, clearly have their own policies and preferences. And they draw
those from wherever they might, probably the news, what they see in the news,
what they hear going out talking to people. And it's usually a pretty
collaborative process where if there's a problem we've identified,…
that needs to be remedied. We work on it and do it.
Sean Nguyen: … And now moving on to the concluding questions, Mr.
Loeser. Over the last decade, we've seen a number of different narratives
emerge to explain the financial crisis. How do you understand what caused the
crisis?
Jeff Loeser: So I think … there's several things.
And the original subprime defaults I really think were based on loans that in
many cases should not have been written that I mentioned like the Pay-Option
ARMs where you had a teaser rate. So you start off …,
first you pay a tiny interest rate. It jumps. And then you're even given the
option of … paying your interest only. And certainly
like a fully educated consumer might be able to realize that. But I do think
early on there was a lot of predatory lending door-to-door [selling] even to
consumers that ... [didn’t understand] what they were doing. And many times were even fraudulently gotten into loans they
shouldn't have been. But that didn't really cause the financial crisis. I think
that was also a mix of the housing bubble, that – the idea was that once these
loans went bad, you would be able to refinance your house. But if your house
loses value, you can’t. And then once the actual economy collapsed, all of the
sudden, you just have... people with ... 30-year fixed loans who just can't
afford the interest rates. And all of the sudden, if your housing value is also
dropped, you can't refinance your house or sell it. And so
you have all these foreclosures. So that – I would say that's my opinion of it.
Sean Nguyen: Looking back on the crisis now
over a decade later, what do you see as its most important lessons for mortgage
originators and state level policy makers?
Jeff Loeser: I think looking back, write normal loans. I don't know
like if there's really a reason that any of these things were needed. Like a
fixed rate loan is probably fine. Or if you want a variable interest rate loan,
just make it a normal variable interest rate loan. I never – I'm not going to
say like something should be illegal – or legal or illegal – but I just don't really
understand what the real accounting thought was that if I'm a bank and I write
someone with a loan that's going to jump in interest three months after you
start paying it, like why you think – ever thought that was going to be paid?
For policymakers, I think a lot of changes have been made. Like even Ohio, very
early on in late 2006, we passed in Ohio what we called Senate Bill 185, which
was a kind of predatory lending, anti-predatory lending bill that very early on
required mortgage brokers and originators to calculate an ability to repay.
Calculate – make sure that you weren't writing a loan just on the value of the
house, but on reasonable probability of repayment. And honestly, I think a lot
of those problems have been corrected. I don't know if there's something to
recommend to policymakers that still has to be done, but I do think those were
good. Good changes coming back then. A lot of it’s been adopted by the federal
government as well as the CFPB [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] and even
the OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency].
Sean Nguyen: Well,
thank you so much for your time today, Mr. Loeser.
Jeff Loeser: Yeah, no problem. Thank you guys for having me. I really appreciate it.
[END OF SESSION]
[1] Gretchen Morgenson, “Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid,” The New York Times, October 5, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/business/06countrywide.html